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Abstract 
Where trust monies are used in breach of trust to pay for the deposit for a property, the courts 
have held that any mortgage loan which was used to fund the purchase does not count as the 
trustee’s contribution to the purchase price for the purpose of determining the trustee’s and the 
beneficiary’s respective beneficial ownership in the property. This article considers two issues. 
First, if trust monies are used only after the trustee has paid for the deposit using his own money, 
are the loan monies obtained by the trustee under the mortgage still liable to be discounted as his 
contribution? Second, does it make a difference in the assessment whether the beneficiary is 
seeking to trace the misapplied trust funds into the sale proceeds or an account of profits which 
the trustee obtained in breach of the no-profit rule? 
 
Introduction 
Conventionally, where a trustee uses a mixture of misapplied trust funds and his own money to 
purchase a property, the beneficiary of the trust is entitled to claim a share in the property 
proportionate to how much the trust monies contributed to the purchase price of the property. 
Thus, in Scott v Scott [1964] VR 3001 (Scott), where a trustee misused £1,014 from an estate to 
purchase a property with a cost of £1,700, the Supreme Court of Victoria held that the trustee 
was liable to pay the estate 1,014/1,700 of the property’s increment in value, over and above the 
sum of £1,014 which the trustee had repaid the estate. Likewise, in Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 
AC 1022 (Foskett), the House of Lords held by a majority that the plaintiff beneficiaries were 
entitled to a share in the proceeds from the trustee’s whole life policy commensurate to how 
much the misappropriated trust monies had contributed to the premiums paid under the 
policy.3 In that case, Lord Millett held:4 
Where a trustee wrongfully uses trust money to provide part of the cost of acquiring an 
asset, the beneficiary is entitled at his option either to claim a proportionate share of the 
asset or to enforce a lien upon it to secure his personal claim against the trustee for the 
amount of the misapplied money. 
However, the position is less straightforward in a case where the errant trustee also funded the 
purchase of the property using monies from a loan secured by a mortgage over the property. The 
question in such a situation is usually characterized as whether the loan monies ought to be 
counted as the trustee’s contribution to the purchase price, which in turn determines how the 
beneficial ownership in the property (or the sale proceeds thereof) ought to be divided between 
the trustee and the beneficiary. Interestingly, the issue has thus far only been considered in a 
handful of Australian cases. In the seminal case of Paul A Davies (Australia) Pty Ltd (in liq) v 
Davies [1983] 1 NSWLR 4405 (Paul A Davies), where the defaulting directors used the 
company’s money to fund the deposit for a property before obtaining a mortgage loan using the 
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property as security, the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that the loan monies did not 
count as the directors’ contribution; and since the only contribution to the purchase price came 
from the company, it was entitled to all the profits from the sale, subject to the court’s award of 
just allowances to the directors. 
The purpose of this article is to examine two issues in this area of the law. The first is concerned 
with the applicability and relevance of Paul A Davies where trust monies are used after the 
trustee has paid for the deposit for the property and obtained the mortgage loan using his own 
resources. In such a situation, are the loan monies obtained by the trustee under the mortgage still 
liable to be discounted as his contribution for the purpose of calculating his share of the sale 
proceeds? The second issue, which appears to arise from certain observations which were made 
in Paul A Davies, is this: does it make a difference in the assessment whether the beneficiary is 
seeking to trace the misapplied trust funds into the sale proceeds, or an account of profits which 
the trustee obtained in breach of the no-profit rule? 
Before considering these issues, it is apposite to first examine the case of Paul A Davies in closer 
detail. 
 
Paul A Davies 
In Paul A Davies, the defendant directors entered into a contract to purchase a property for the 
sum of $340,000. The purchase monies came from two sources: (i) monies that the directors 
obtained from the plaintiff company in breach of fiduciary duty, which were used to pay for the 
deposit of $17,000 and another sum of $35,000 towards the purchase price; and (ii) a bank loan 
secured by a mortgage on the property which was used to complete the purchase. At first 
instance, the judge held on the authority of Scott that the company was entitled only to a 
proportionate share of the profits from the sale of the property. 
On appeal, the New South Wales Court of Appeal overruled the trial judge’s decision and held 
that the company was entitled to all the profits. In their separate written decisions, all three 
judges in the New South Wales Court of Appeal placed emphasis on the fact that it was through 
the use of trust monies in the first instance which enabled the directors to obtain the mortgage 
loan. Moffitt P held that: 
a distinction should be drawn and the principle [in Scott] not applied where the fiduciary 
does not provide his own money, but, having used trust money to provide the deposit 
and/or part of the purchase money so as to acquire an equitable interest in the property 
provides the balance by a mortgage loan on the security of the property.6 
Likewise, Hutley JA held that since the directors held the property on trust for the company, they 
committed another breach of trust by mortgaging the property without the consent of the 
company. In Hutley JA’s view, it would be 
inconsistent with any principle that resources which a trustee gained by further breach of 
trust can be treated as provided from his own resources for the purpose of the rule that 
profits are to be apportioned between the trustee and the trust estate in accordance with 
their respective contribution.7 
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Finally, Mahoney JA held that there were two relevant principles in question: the tracing 
principle (‘[w]here a trustee has misapplied trust money, the beneficiary may require the trustee 
to repay it with interest or, at his option, may claim that into which the trust money has been 
converted’8) and the profit principle (‘[a] trustee must account to the trust for any unauthorised 
profit which he has made from the trust or his position as trustee’9). Mahoney JA reserved his 
opinion as to the application of the tracing principle, but held that the profit principle prohibited 
the defendants from retaining the profit that was proportionate to the bank loan. This was so for 
two closely related reasons: first, the defendants’ contractual rights and/or proprietary interest in 
the property had been acquired using the company’s monies and were of the nature of trust 
assets; second, in order to borrow the money to complete the purchase, the defendants had made 
an unauthorized use of the property which they were holding for the company.10 
 
What if the trustee paid for the deposit using his own money? 
The outcome in Paul A Davies appears eminently sensible: indeed, it would appear anomalous if 
a trustee could springboard from his breach of trust and acquire an interest in a trust property by 
using it as security to obtain further loans to complete the acquisition of the property.11 This then 
raises the question: in the situation where trust monies were eventually used to complete the 
purchase of the property, but the trustee had paid for the deposit for the property using his own 
money in the first instance, are the monies obtained under a loan secured by the property still 
liable to be discounted as the trustee’s contribution to the purchase price? In such a situation, 
there is plainly no breach of trust to speak of when the trustee mortgaged the property: the trustee 
obtained an equitable interest in the property using his own money and did not hold it on trust for 
anyone when it was used to secure the loan. If that is correct, then there appears to be no reason 
why the monies obtained under the loan should not be counted as the trustee’s contribution to the 
purchase price. 
This conclusion is supported by a number of authorities. In the case of In the Marriage of 
Wagstaff (1990) 14 Fam LR 7812 (Marriage of Wagstaff), the question arose as to how the profits 
from the sale of a property ought to be apportioned between the appellant wife, the respondent 
husband, and the wife’s children from a previous marriage. The deposit for the property had been 
paid for using, in breach of trust, $18,241 from funds which the wife held on trust for the 
children, and $2,550 which was borrowed from the husband’s mother. The balance which was 
needed to complete the purchase was borrowed under a loan secured by a mortgage over the 
property. Strauss, Baker, and McCall JJ in the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia 
emphasized that this was a case where, as was the case in Paul A Davies, ‘the trust moneys have 
been used as the deposit on a property and the balance coming from a loan to the parties which 
was only possible because of the use of the trust moneys in the first instance’.13Accordingly, the 
court held that the children were entitled to 18,241/20,971 of the net proceeds from the sale of 
the property. 
Consistent with the analysis above, the learned authors of Lewin on Trusts, citing the cases 
of Paul A Davies and Marriage of Wagstaff, observe that: 
If trust money is used to pay the whole or part of the deposit on an asset, or the deposit 
and part of the purchase money paid on completion, the balance of the purchase money 
being raised by the trustee or other wrongdoer by mortgage secured on the asset, the 
money raised on mortgage does not count as a contribution by him to the purchase, since 
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his ability to obtain the loan was dependent on the unauthorised acquisition with trust 
money of the asset which formed the security.14 
In at least two cases where it was found or assumed that the deposit was notpaid for using 
misapplied trust funds, the courts have expressly held that the monies obtained under the 
mortgage loan ought to be counted as the trustee’s contribution. In Telnet Pty Ltd v 
Linton (unreported) BC9807776 (14 May 1998)15(Telnet), the liquidators of the plaintiff 
company alleged that the defendant’s husband had obtained a loan of $1.06 million from the 
company in breach of his fiduciary duty which was used to fund the purchase of a property. 
However, the court found that the defendant had used her own money to pay for the deposit for 
the property. In relation to how the sum of $400,000 which she had obtained under a mortgage 
loan ought to be treated for the purpose of calculating the parties’ respective shares in the 
property, Hulme J distinguished the case on hand from Paul A Davies and held: 
What significance should be afforded the $400,000 borrowed from [the bank]? In my view it 
should go to the credit of [the defendant] in the determination of the respective interests of 
herself and [the plaintiff] in the subject property. This is not a case where the security for the 
money borrowed solely was, or was derived from, moneys affected with fiduciary obligations – cf 
Paul A Davies (Aust) Pty Ltd v Davies (1983) 1 NSWLR 440.16 
Subsequently, in Mavaddat v Lee [2007] WASCA 14117 (Mavaddat), the appellant director, 
without authorization and in breach of fiduciary duty, used $150,000 from the company’s 
account to purchase a property with a purchase price of $320,000. The director obtained the 
remaining $170,000 through a bank loan secured by a mortgage over the property. However, it 
was not the respondent’s case at trial that the property was used to secure the balance of the 
purchase price. As such, when the matter reached the Western Australia Court of Appeal, the 
court held that it was to be assumed that ‘the balance of the purchase price was provided by the 
appellant from funds borrowed from the bank in circumstances in which there was not, and is 
not, any contention that these funds, too, were obtained only through the misuse of trust 
property, whether by way of mortgage or otherwise’.18 In the circumstances, Steytler P (with 
whom Pullin JA agreed) and McLure JA held that the principle in Scott ought to apply, and the 
company’s interest in the property was limited to the extent of its proportionate contribution to 
the purchase price, ie 46.875%.19 
It is worth noting, for completeness, that the case of JGM Nominees Pty Ltd v Caveat Finance 
Pty Ltd (in liq) [2009] VSC 60420 (JGM Nominees) appears to depart from the authorities 
discussed above. In JGM Nominees, Habersberger J in the Victoria Supreme Court did not regard 
the funds borrowed under the mortgage as the trustee’s contribution, even though the misapplied 
trust monies in question were not used to pay for the deposit for the property. Nevertheless, it 
seems unlikely that future cases will follow JGM Nominees: the issue in relation to the mortgage 
loan was only briefly dealt with in two paragraphs in the judgment, and the court did not have 
the benefit of hearing the arguments on the relevant jurisprudence as the other parties who had 
initially made a claim to the funds in question all withdrew from the proceeding in the course of 
the trial.21 
In summary, therefore, it appears as a matter of principle and authority that the monies obtained 
under a mortgage loan ought to be counted as a trustee’s contribution to the purchase price of a 
property if the trustee paid for the deposit using his own money. As alluded to earlier, however, 
Mahoney JA’s judgment in Paul A Davies appears to suggest that a different outcome may arise 
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depending on whether the tracing principle or the profit principle is being applied. Does this 
affect the analysis that has been presented thus far? It is to this issue that the discussion now 
turns. 
 
The tracing principle and the profit principle 
To put the issue in context, it is necessary to first set out the theoretical distinction between the 
two types of claim associated with the profit principle and the tracing principle, ie a claim by a 
beneficiary for a constructive trust over the illicit profits made by an errant trustee, and a claim 
by a beneficiary to vindicate his proprietary interest in the traceable proceeds of trust property. 
As to the former, the claim for a constructive trust over the illicit profits gained by the trustee is 
premised on the well-established principle that a trustee is prohibited from using his position as a 
trustee to make an unauthorized gain for himself.22 On the other hand, as to the latter, a 
beneficiary who is faced with the trustee’s misapplication of trust property can elect to falsify the 
unauthorized transaction, in which case the trustee becomes personally liable to reconstitute the 
trust property, or he can elect to adopt the transaction, which is the tactical option where the 
transaction turns out to be profitable.23Where the beneficiary elects to adopt the transaction, the 
beneficiary effectively asserts his beneficial ownership in the substituted asset;24 to that end, it is 
necessary to establish by the rules of tracing that the substituted asset represents the misapplied 
trust property.25 
As has been observed elsewhere, it is possible to ‘deploy both theories on the same facts’.26 
Nevertheless, the question for present purposes is whether the two types of claims ought to lead 
to different outcomes in the situation where a trustee purchased a property using a mixture of 
misapplied trust funds and his own money. In particular, does the mere fact that the beneficiary 
is relying on the profit principle entitle him to a more generous recovery? In Australian Postal 
Corporation v Lutak (1991) 21 NSWLR 58427 (Australian Postal Corporation), which appears 
to be the only case after Paul A Davies where the issue was squarely considered, Bryson J held 
that the principle in Scott ‘relates to a proportionate interest in the property, not to profits or 
gains arising from dealing in property purchased with a mixed fund’.28 According to Bryson J, 
The rule that a trustee may not derive a profit from his trust would seem to require 
that, irrespective of the source from which he raised his contribution, a trustee should not 
receive any profit related to that contribution; the whole of the profit of the investment 
should go to the beneficiary.29 
On this view, in contradistinction to the tracing principle, the profit principle would apparently 
require a trustee to surrender all the profits even if he had obtained the mortgage loan in question 
using his own resources. Further, the trustee would be required to surrender all the profits 
regardless of the proportion which the trust monies bore to the purchase price. 
However, it would be peculiar if the issue is governed by two seemingly separate principles 
which give rise to different results. More importantly, it would appear unduly artificial and unfair 
if a beneficiary could significantly improve his position and claim all the profits from the sale of 
the property, simply by asserting that he is relying on the profit principle as opposed to the 
tracing principle. The argument to the contrary, as one might expect, is that a trustee who had 
misused trust monies to acquire an asset had used his position as a trustee to make the profits, 
and is therefore in breach of the no-profit rule. But as Scott and Foskett show, where a trustee 
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makes a profit from the use of a mixed fund comprising trust monies and his own money, the law 
does not go so far as to allow the beneficiary to claim all the profits. Indeed, if it were otherwise, 
there would never be any occasion for the proportionate division of profits as occurred in cases 
like Scott and Foskett. 
Further, the strict position propounded by Bryson J in Australian Postal Corporation does not 
accord with Paul A Davies, nor has it been followed in later cases. In Paul A Davies, Mahoney 
JA held that the defendants were not entitled to any of the profits essentially for the reason that 
they had used the company’s monies to obtain an interest in the property, and thereafter used the 
property to secure the loan which was used to complete the purchase of the property. Thus, even 
though Mahoney JA was avowedly applying the profit principle, the learned judge nonetheless 
looked at whether the defendants had made their own contributions towards the purchase price, 
which is consistent with the approach taken by Moffitt P and Hutley JA in their concurring 
judgments. Properly understood, therefore, any perceived difference between the tracing 
principle and the profit principle in the present context is in fact more apparent than real. 
Similarly, in the subsequent cases discussed above, the approach which has been consistently 
applied by the courts is to examine how much the trustee contributed to the purchase price in 
order to determine his proportionate share of the profits. The following observations by the Full 
Court of the Federal Court of Australia in V-Flow Pty Ltd v Holyoake Industries (Vic) Pty 
Ltd (2013) 296 ALR 41830 further support the conclusion that notwithstanding the no-profit rule, 
a proportionate division of profits is available where the trustee makes his own contribution to 
the purchase price of the property: 
Where property is acquired in breach of fiduciary duty, with trust money mixed with 
personal money, it may be appropriate, in some cases, to restrict the profit or gain for 
which an account is to be given to a proportionate part of the total profit or gain, based 
on the quantum of the trust money used compared with the quantum of personal money 
used. However, it will not be an appropriate case for the application of that principle 
where the fiduciary does not use his own money but, having used trust money to provide 
the deposit or part of the purchase price, so as to acquire an equitable interest in the 
property, provides the balance of the purchase price by way of a loan secured by 
mortgage on the property.31 
In any event, despite Bryson J’s statement in Australian Postal Corporation that the whole of the 
profits ought to be surrendered irrespective of the source from which a trustee raised his 
contribution, the learned judge in fact went on in the judgment to consider whether the trustees 
had contributed their own money towards the acquisition of the property.32 In that case, it was 
clear on any view of the matter that the trustees were not entitled to any profit: the purchase 
monies used by the trustees comprised only proceeds from the sale of stamps which had been 
stolen from the plaintiff (from which the deposit for the property was funded), and monies from 
loans which were secured by a mortgage over the property. 
Is the fact that the trustee is allowed to retain a proportionate part of the profits contrary to the 
prophylactic nature of equity? It would be erroneous to take the view that the tenets of 
prophylaxis or deterrence require the trustee to surrender all the profits where the trustee 
purchased a property using a mixed fund comprising trust monies and his own money: the fact 
that the trustee is not allowed to profit from the misuse of trust property is precisely the reason 
why the trustee is only entitled to keep the portion of the profits commensurate to his own 
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contribution.33 As Lord Millett held in Foskett, the rationale for allowing a beneficiary to recover 
a proportionate share of the profits is that ‘the trustee cannot be allowed to make a profit from 
the use of the trust money’.34Rejecting the rule that the beneficiary is only entitled to a lien for 
the sum of the misapplied trust monies where the trustee also used his own money to acquire the 
new asset, Lord Millett further stated:35 
In my view the time has come to state unequivocally that English law has no such rule. It 
conflicts with the rule that a trustee must not benefit from his trust. 
 
Conclusion 
Where trust funds are used in breach of trust to purchase a property, the beneficiaries of the trust 
are entitled to claim a share in the property proportionate to how much the trust monies 
contributed to the purchase price of the property. The matter becomes complicated where the 
defaulting trustee also funded the purchase of the property using a mortgage loan. This article 
considered two issues in this area of the law. In particular, it is argued that where trust monies 
are used only after the trustee has paid for the deposit for the property and obtained the mortgage 
loan using his own resources, the monies under the loan ought to be counted as the trustee’s own 
contribution for the purpose of calculating his share of the sale proceeds. The same result obtains 
whether the beneficiary purports to trace the misapplied trust funds into the sale proceeds or to 
seek an account of profits which the trustee obtained in breach of the no-profit rule. 
 
Ruo Yu Tan is an associate in the Commercial Litigation practice group of Rajah & Tann 
Singapore LLP. 
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